BS IEC 61513:2001 pdf free download

BS IEC 61513:2001 pdf free download.Nuclear power plants一 In strumentation and control for systems important to safety一 General requirements for systems.
The objective of the requirements of this clause is to derive input requirements for the specification of the l&C FSE and input constraints for the l&C architectural design. resulting from the plant safety design base and the plant context.
IAEA 50-C-D Rev 1 and IAEA 50-SG-D11 define a number of individual safety principles that together make up an integrated overall safety approach ensuring the safety of a NPP. These principles will be used in the design by considering all relevant “Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs) and successive physical barriers to keep radiation exposure to workers, public, and environment within limits (see clauses Al, A.2 and A.3). Following this approach, the plant design base specifies an appropriate quality level for the plant functions and systems necessary to maintain the plant in a normal operating state, to ensure the correct response to all PIEs, and to facilitate the long-term management of the plant following an accident.
5.1.1 Review of the functional, performance and Independence requirements
The functional, performance and independence requirements for the l&C functions important to safety and the principles of operation of the plant are defined in the plant safety design base which is an inherent element of the overall l&C design project, The requirements concerning human-machine interactions consider the principles of operation together with ergonomic considerations in order to minimise failures due to human factors.
The following inputs shall be provided in the plant safety design base:
• the defence in-depth concept of the plant (see clause A.3), and the groups of functions provided to address PIEs sequences in order to fulfil the safety objectives (see clause A.2);
NOTE 1 In cases where the reliability of a function is required to be very high, the requirements specification for the plant and the I&C stipulate different lines of defence for the same PIE, for example, two or more Independent and functionally diverse physical Initiation criteria and, If appropriate, a second, functionally diverse, independent, redundant mechanical system for accident control.
NOTE 2 The defence in-depth echelons may include functions important to safety and may include other functions. The requirements of this standard address only those functions that are important to safety.
• the functional and performance requirements of the functions of the plant important to safety needed to meet the general safety requirements (see clause A.3);
NOTE 3 Where functional validation is required (see 6.1.3.1). the design base provides the initial conditions. allowable limits and allowable rate of change of the plant variables to be controlled by the l&C systems important to safety
• the role of automation and prescribed operator actions in the management of anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions (see clause A.3);
• a task analysis in accordance with 3.2 of IEC 60964 defining which functions should be assigned to operators and which functions should be assigned to machines:
• the variables to be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual actions;BS IEC 61513 pdf download.